Abstract
Introduction
Fair exchange is a well studied problem. Especially after the optimized fair exchange concept was firstly proposed by Asokan, etc [1] , many schemes [2] are proposed to implement fair exchange with off-line Trusted Third Party. In [3] , Chen et al. ingeniously observed that the full power of fair exchange is not necessary in many applications, since there are some mechanisms that provide a more natural dispute resolution than the reliance on a TTP. Chen et al, proposed the concept of concurrent signature, CS for short, at Eurocrypt2004. Such signature scheme allows two parties, without any third party, to produce and exchange two ambiguous signatures which are ambiguous for any third party until an extra piece of information (called keystone) is released by one of the parties.
In order to strength the ambiguity of the signature before keystone is released, Susilo, Mu and Zhang [4] further proposed a strong notion called perfect concurrent signatures, PCS for short. Unfortunately, In [5] Wang et al, observed that, in PCS, the initiator generate the two keystones independently which enable the initiator could bind different ambiguous signature, but not the one send to the matching singer, with the one generated by the matching signer. To resolve this problem, Wang et al, proposed improved perfect concurrent signature, called iPCS for short. The difference is that in iPCS the initial signer and matching signer generate one piece of keystone respectively. But in PCS only the initiator generates the two piece of keystone alone.
Later, in [6] , Chow et al, improved their generic construction of (Identity-based) perfect concurrent signature with the idea from [5] . Asymmetric concurrent signature [7] , tripartite concurrent signature [8] and mutli-party concurrent signature [11, 12] are proposed later. Recently, Feng et al, apply the concept of concurrent signature to establish the new concept of fair authenticated key exchange protocol in [11] .
However, we found proposals given in [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10] are vulnerable to follow attack scene: Any party of one (perfect) concurrent signature could generate multiple ambiguous signatures, for different messages, which could be bound with the same keystone at the same time. These messages maybe different from the one included in the ambiguous signature sent to the matching (initial) singer. Based on this observation, we propose that accountability [12] should be one of the security properties of (perfect) concurrent signature. Accountability means any third party could be convinced that the ambiguous signature, which can pass the verify algorithm, is the only one generated by the signer based on the released keystone.
In Section 2, we briefly overview the protocol structure and algorithms used in PCS and iPCS, and discuss the security properties of concurrent signature. Then we descript the attack against accountability of iPCS1 in section 3. Proposal to avoid this kind of attack is given in Section 4. Section 5 is the conclusion of this paper.
Overview the improved Perfect Concurrent Signature
As mentioned by [5] , the PCS and iPCS use the same protocol structure and algorithms, so, in this section, we firstly review the concept of PCS [4] and secondly review the iPCS1 protocol [5] . At last, we descript the new security property, accountability of (Perfect) Concurrent Signature in section 2.3.
Overview of Perfect Concurrent Signature
Basically, PCS consists of four algorithms: SETUP, ASIGN, AVERIFY and VERIFY as described below. Note that the above are just the basic algorithms for generating and verifying perfect concurrent signatures. In the following concrete iPCS1 protocol, it explicitly describes how to generate and verify keystones, and how to exchange concurrent signatures between two parties without the help of a TTP.
In PCS, the initiator chooses the two pieces of keystone for herself and the matching signer independently, which result in the attack scene described in section3.1 of [5] . Then Wang, et al, argued to let the responder choose the second piece of keystone and proposed the iPCS1 and iPCS2 protocols. Follow section 2.2 will give the specified iPCS1 protocol.
Overview of iPCS1
As in [3, 4, 5] , iPCS1 assumes that the SETUP algorithm is already executed and that the initial signer Alice and the matching signer Bob want to exchange their signatures on messages , A B m m respectively.
The initial Alice performs as follow:
− Choose a random keystone K k ∈ and set , and k'=r mod q. 
The accountability of CS/PCS
The original security model of concurrent signature in [3] , as well as those defined in [4, 5, 8, 10] , requires a (perfect) concurrent signature to satisfy correctness, ambiguity, unforgeability and fairness. The correctness makes sure the signature will work out the desired result. Ambiguity stress that any third party could not identify who is the exactly signer of one ambiguous signature before the keystone is released. The unforgeability stress only the one, who has the private key, could generate the ambiguous signature bound with the keystone. The fairness request the initial signer and matching signer are bound with the ambiguous signatures at the same time when the keystone is released. However, These four properties do not stress the signer could only generate one ambiguous signature bound to the key stone. As defined in [12] , Accountability of E_commerce protocol is the property whereby the association of a unique originator with an object or action can be proved to a third party. Hereunder, we will define the accountability for concurrent signature.
Different from the definition of accountability for E-Commerce protocol defined in [12] , the accountability of concurrent signature stress the uniqueness of the message bound with the keystone and signer.
Definition 1: Accountability of concurrent signature is the property whereby the unique association of a signer, a keystone set with a message can be proved to a third party based on the valid protocol messages.
Informally speaking, accountability requires the signers could convince themselves and any third party that the messages signed in the ambiguous signature are the unique set generated in one protocol run. Any signer could not generate ambiguous signature for any messages other then the one he send to other signers in his ambiguous signature, which could satisfy the VERIFY and AVERIFY algorithm.
Attack against the accountability of iPCS1
Before we give the attack scene against accountability based on iPCS1 [5] , we study a case in real world. Alice is an inexpert music maker, Bob is a manager of shopping mall, Carl is a music reseller. Bob loves one song named as "happy shopping" created by Alice and decides to buy it. Then they run a concurrent signature protocol and exchange the ambiguous signature and release the keystone. Then Alice could get money from the bank and Bob get the song. However, based on the keystone used for this concurrent signature protocol run, Alice could generate another valid ambiguous signature for another song "elegant shopping" and show it to Carl. Carl is convinced that this "elegant shopping" is welcome to shopping mall so he may decide to buy the copyright of this song. It is clear enough that this flaw of concurrent signature gives Alice the chance to get advantage over Carl and Bob.
We found this results from the fact that in proposals [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10] , only the keystones are used to bind the two ambiguity signature together. The messages which are signed and exchanged were not bind with the protocol run. Here we give the attack scene against iPCS1: − Choose a random keystone k K ∈ and set 
An update version of the iPCS1
The attack, discussed above, against the accountability of PCS and iPCS results from the fact that Alice or Bob could generate multiple ambiguous signatures for different messages based on the same keystone, for example, ( , )
A A m σ and ( , )
A A m σ . The fundamental reason of this attack is that the keystone is transferred to the parameter used to create the signature for messages but the messages are not used in the transformation from keystone to signature parameter. This gives chance to both Alice and Bob to generate multiple signatures for different messages based on the same keystone. It is intuitive to include the messages in the transformation process from keystone to signature parameter to avoid such attack. In order to keep the properties of the perfect concurrent signature, we propose the update version of iPCS1, called uPCS1 for short, with the following updated calculations:
The assumption, algorithms: SETUP. ASIGN, AVERIFY, VERIFY, and protocol structure keeps the same as iPCS1. Hereunder is uPCS1: 1. The initial Alice performs as follow:
− Choose a random keystone k K ∈ and set Alice releases the keystone and his signature on it at the same time. This makes sure that Bob will not forge valid keystones. Based on the results in [3, 4, 5] and the discussions previously provided, it is easy to see that the uPCS1 is truly perfect concurrent signature protocol because the uPCS1 dose not change the protocol structure and algorithm used in iPCS1. Compare to iPCS1, the uPCS1 has the same efficiency because uPCS1 only add one parameter for hash function. 
Conclusion and future work
Concurrent signature [3] provides a novel idea for fair exchange protocol which enables two distrusted party to exchange digital items without any third party. Reference [4] proposed the perfect concurrent signature to strengthen the ambiguity of the concurrent signature. And then [5] points out there has an attack against the fairness of PCS and propose the iPCS. In this paper, we found that dishonest signer could generate multiple signature pairs for different messages based on the same keystone in iPCS, which is absolutely unfair. To avoid such attack, we propose the uPCS1 to bind the keystone and messages together as discussed in section 3. Most important, we observed that concurrent signature proposals in [3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10] also have such flaw. This spurs us to define a new security property, accountability, for concurrent signature. As the future work, we will try to implement some concrete fair exchange applications, especially for fair exchanges in P2P network, based on the uPCS1.
